（来源：East Asia Forum，2025-10-03）
On 22 September 2025, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) formally launched its presidential contest to elect a successor to Shigeru Ishiba. Five candidates — Sanae Takaichi, Shinjiro Koizumi, Takayuki Kobayashi, Yoshimasa Hayashi and Toshimitsu Motegi — have declared their bids. China is watching its neighbour closely as the outcome of this snap election could inject new uncertainty into China–Japan relations.
China’s unease towards the LDP election reflects the concern that its fragile rapprochement with Japan could be reversed. Despite the various unsettled troubles between China and Japan, Ishiba’s rise to LDP President — instead of his hardline nationalist competitor Takaichi — in September 2024 offered an opportunity to ‘renormalise’ the relationship.
Tokyo made cautious strides towards Beijing during Ishiba’s one-year tenure as prime minister. Though he failed to make a formal state visit, Ishiba quickly signalled goodwill to China through multilateral diplomacy. He met Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Vientiane on 10 October 2024 and President Xi Jinping at the APEC Summit in Lima on 15 November 2024. At APEC, Xi said that China–Japan relations were ‘in a critical period of improvement and development’. On both occasions, leaders from both sides expressed their will to build ‘constructive and stable’ bilateral relations.
In response to uncertainties stemming from US policies, China and Japan have adopted hedging strategies for risk aversion, turning a potential moment of tension into a window for cautious engagement. The fourth trilateral China–Japan–South Korea agriculture ministers’ meeting held on 12 August 2025 reflects the growing space for collaboration amid the shifting geopolitical landscape in the Trump 2.0 era.
But with Ishiba’s resignation, the attention of Chinese media and academic circles is turning to the Japanese leadership candidates and where Japan’s China policy might be heading.
The scenario Beijing dreads most is the election of Sanae Takaichi. As a political heir to former prime minister Shinzo Abe, Takaichi has repeatedly criticised China and embraced a hardline nationalist approach to foreign affairs. Her leadership could make bilateral relations more volatile, especially considering her visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.
Yet at her campaign kick-off on 19 September 2025, Takaichi sidestepped any commitment to visiting Yasukuni — in sharp contrast to her firm commitment in the 2024 campaign. Takaichi’s softer attitude towards the Yasukuni issue hints that her foreign policy might not stick to a hawkish doctrine and could be more pragmatic once in office.
Another front-runner, Shinjiro Koizumi, is also a source of concern for China. He has repeatedly visited the Yasukuni Shrine but has stated that decisions regarding visits, if elected prime minister, should be made with ‘appropriate judgment’. This suggests a cautious approach to the historical issue, similar to Takaichi’s.
At the age of 44 and still as a junior politician, Koizumi also lacks extensive diplomatic experience, which could make navigating China relations tricky. But his inexperience also gives him room to manoeuvre and take a softer stance with Beijing, if he chooses a more pragmatic approach.
Takayuki Kobayashi, a rising star in the LDP, also takes a hawkish position on China. As Japan’s first-ever minister for economic security, he focused heavily on reducing the Japanese economy’s ‘over-dependence’ on China — a clear signal of his hardline stance. Yet Kobayashi, like Koizumi, has never held top cabinet posts in key areas — such as foreign or defense minister — leaving his ability to steer the broader China–Japan relationship untested.
Compared with the candidates above, Toshimitsu Motegi — who is ideologically more liberal and has served as foreign minister during 2019–21 — appears steadier in China’s eyes. His approach to China would likely be a pragmatic blend of engagement and caution, reflecting his extensive experience in foreign affairs and his faction’s moderate stance within the LDP. But it is noteworthy that Motegi has emphasised the necessity of close cooperation with the United States to effectively deter China’s growing military assertiveness.
For China, the most reassuring outcome might be the election of Yoshimasa Hayashi. Hayashi is a seasoned LDP veteran and former foreign minister with deep experience in managing diplomatic issues. Branded ‘pro-China’ and a ‘panda hugger’, he even faced pressure to step down from head of the Japan–China Friendship Parliamentarians’ Union in 2021. Like Ishiba, Hayashi represents liberal voices within the LDP and is an adept diplomat in China affairs. His leadership would likely bring a more predictable and consistent hand to China–Japan relations — a welcome prospect for Beijing amid regional uncertainties.
Structural tensions with Beijing, pressure from a Trump-led United States and Japan’s fragmented, polarised domestic politics all constrain Tokyo’s options. The LDP, weakened by scandals and historic election losses, has become a minority party in both houses at the National Diet. Meanwhile, the ‘China School’ bureaucrats — specialists in China affairs — in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs are being sidelined in decision-making.
Any future leader, regardless of ideology, may feel compelled to adopt a tougher stance on China to manage domestic pressures and cater to the right-leaning public opinion. Stability in the China–Japan relationship is never guaranteed.
Shao Jingkai is Lecturer at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University.
Wang Guangtao is Associate Professor at the Center for Japanese Studies, Fudan University.