Since the beginning of the Donald Trump administration, it is not only the so-called reciprocal tariffs policy that has caused concern among US allies, but also the mounting pressure to share the burden of military security responsibilities. While the recent US-Japan tariff negotiations have finally yielded an agreement, discontent and even mutual suspicion persist between the two nations in the realm of military security.
The US-Japan alliance has long been the cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy, which is unlikely to be abandoned by Japan easily in the short term. However, the immense shockwaves of US unpredictability are an inescapable reality that Japan must confront. Considering this situation, Japan has begun to show signs of change in its military security policy.
First, Japan is paying more attention to minilateral security frameworks. Currently, the country is pursuing minilateral cooperation with other Asia-Pacific nations beyond the US. Building upon the US-Japan alliance, Japan has substantially strengthened cooperation with two major American allies in Asia, South Korea and the Philippines, enhancing trilateral cooperation mechanisms involving the US, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the US, Japan, and the Philippines.
However, minilateral security architectures struggle to truly escape American influence, leaving Japan with limited scope for substantive influence. It is evident that within the minilateral security arrangements actively advanced by Japan, the US consistently assumes the leading position.
Then, Japan has also been strengthening its quasi-alliance strategy. At the bilateral level, Japan is actively seeking security partners beyond the US. So far, it has signed reciprocal access agreements with Australia, the UK, the Philippines, permitting the deployment of troops on each other's territories. This further provides institutional convenience for the Japan Self-Defence Forces' going overseas. Previously, Japan had also established 2+2 bilateral dialogue mechanisms with these countries, laying the cooperative foundation for quasi-alliance arrangements. Japan is reluctant to put all its eggs in one basket. Yet it must be recognized that while Japan seeks quasi-allies, these potential partners are also hedging their bets, oscillating between courting the US and seeking alternative allies. Japan is neither their priority nor sole option.
Japan's quasi-alliance strategy has an intention of targeting China. Yet, Japan and its quasi-alliance partners display notable differences in their stances and strategic preferences toward China, which makes the foundation of Japan's quasi-alliance framework rather fragile. For instance, while Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to Japan did advance bilateral security ties, India has simultaneously sought to improve relations with China. Japan's hopes of containing China through the QUAD framework or via a Japan-India quasi-alliance strategy are unlikely to succeed.
Moreover, by revising the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan has gradually broken through the taboo on lethal weapons exports.
In 2025, Japan aims to export six second-hand Abukuma-class frigates to the Philippines. It also clinched a $6.5 billion agreement with Australia for the export of Mogami-class frigates, marking Japan's first post-war operational warship export order. These countries are not only key members of the minilateral security frameworks but also the quasi-alliance partners that Japan is striving to cultivate. Those efforts have partially alleviated Japan's strategic anxiety stemming from the US' neglect of the US-Japan alliance.
However, these actions substantially exceed Japan's exclusively defensive defense principle. Exporting lethal weaponry to regional nations not only intensifies the arms race and security dilemmas across the Asia-Pacific but also risks undermining strategic mutual trust between countries. The negative implications warrant high vigilance from the international community.
Finally, it must be noted that Japan currently faces considerable domestic political uncertainty, raising doubts about the extent to which military security will be prioritized by the next administration. The chaotic political landscape and sluggish economic conditions within Japan make it difficult for the government to carve out sufficient space for minilateral security frameworks and quasi-alliance strategies.
Wang Guangtao is associate professor at the Center for Japanese Studies of Fudan University, and Shao Jingkai is lecturer at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs of Shanghai International Studies University. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn